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INTRODUCTION
Corporate law allocates to the board of directors the central
role in the management of the American corporation. Three legal
principles, taken together, coalesce to focus legal attention on cor-
porate boards of directors. First, most states require board ap-
proval for important decisions.' For example, organic changes to
the corporate form such as mergers, sales of control, and sales of
all or substantially all of a corporation's assets all require board
approval. Second, by law, corporations are run by or under the
direction of the board of directors.2 Courts have traditionally in-
terpreted this requirement narrowly, and many board decisions are
therefore considered nondelegable.3 Finally, at least in theory,
boards of directors are ultimately responsible for corporate per-
formance. Not only do directors owe shareholders a fiduciary duty
of loyalty, they also owe shareholders a fiduciary duty of care.4 In
essence, this means that directors must not only refrain from steal-
ing from the corporation, but they must also attempt to maximize
the economic value of the firm.
Despite these legal requirements, the boards of directors of
modern corporations6 meet only episodically. Typically, a board of
directors is comprised of a number of corporate managers and a
majority of part-time outsiders who are nominated, and are some-
times under the influence and control of the very same corporate
managers they are supposed to monitor. Corporate law recognizes
* The authors are, respectively, a private investor, and J. DuPratt White Professor of
Law, Cornell Law School. Cornell Law School and the International Center for Economic
Research, Turin, Italy, provided valuable research support.
1 See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.01(b) (1984) [hereinafter RMBCA].
2 See id.
3 See McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934).
4 See RMBCA § 8.30 (a)(2).
5 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1992).
6 See RMBCA § 8.01 cmt. ("[I]n large and complex publicly held corporations it is
generally recognized that the board of directors may delegate to appropriate officers those
powers not required by law to be exercised by the board of directors itself."). The Histori-
cal Background to section 8.01 states: "Indeed, such involvement is probably neither prac-
tical nor feasible for even inside directors in many large modern corporations."
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the very generalized powers of boards, and the lack of active in-
volvement in management is reflected in the modern legal
doctrine.7
Thus there is a basic tension in U.S. corporate law. The legal
system imposes broad obligations on directors, while simultane-
ously recognizing the practical reality of their distance from the
corporation in many cases. For years this tension between the the-
oretical requirements of corporate law and the reality of corporate
governance has been resolved by the business judgment rule, which
blunts the practical significance of the formal legal requirements
relating to board conduct.8 In effect, the business judgment rule
insulates directors from liability for decisions that are not tainted
by a conflict of interest.
However, there are a few minimum requirements that must be
met before a corporate director can avail himself of the protection
of the business judgment rule. First, the transaction must not in-
volve a conflict of interest. Second, a director who approved a
challenged transaction must have used the same degree of care that
an ordinarily prudent businessperson in the same circumstances
would have used.9 Finally, directors must have a basic understand-
ing of the business of the corporations on whose boards they sit.
In this Article we argue that shareholders should be able to
contract around the necessity of board oversight of managerial
decisionmaking. For certain firms, board oversight is a myth that
should be abandoned. Some of the authority and responsibility
previously delegated to the board should be returned to the share-
holders. We do not argue this because we think that boards of di-
rectors serve no useful function and are therefore obsolete.
Rather, we argue for limiting the legal authority and responsibility
of the board because we think that, at times, for some firms the
cost of maintaining the legal fiction that boards of directors are
unbiased and knowledgeable representatives of shareholders' in-
terests is greater than its benefits. We propose to permit boards of
directors to serve shareholders more directly when shareholders
choose to structure their firms this way. In particular, we propose
that corporate law be clarified to allow shareholders: (1) to direct
their boards to replace incumbent management; and (2) to allow
shareholders to put up for sale the firms in which they own stock
without the necessity of obtaining prior approval from the board.
7 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
8 See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (11. App. Ct. 1968).
9 See RMBCA § 8.30(a)(2).
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In our view, boards should continue to provide managers with
advice and guidance and to monitor basic conflict of interest trans-
actions. But shareholders should be empowered to adopt a corpo-
rate governance structure that would require boards to replace
poorly performing managers when shareholders direct them to do
so. Shareholders should have the power to elect to require direc-
tors to conduct a search for new managers. And shareholders also
should be able to insert provisions in the corporate charter that
would permit them to vote to require directors to put their com-
pany up for sale, rather than simply to ratify a proposed merger or
sale that has been approved or recommended by the board.
In other words, our proposal would allow shareholders to elect
to change current corporate governance in two fundamental ways
to reflect the realities of modern business practice within a widely
held firm. First, shareholders could elect to take more direct power
to control management. Second, as the true parties in economic
interest, shareholders would be able to organize their firms so as to
enable themselves to realize the possibility of a control or takeover
premium whenever the holders of a majority of such shares deter-
mine a sale of the company to be in their best interest. In pursuit
of this goal, shareholders would be able to strip directors of the
power to block fundamental corporate changes, such as mergers,
over the objections of shareholders. Instead, .shareholders would
be able to elect to have the absolute right to vote on such transac-
tions. We do not believe that shareholders should be able to
micromanage the firms in which they own shares. Nor do we pro-
pose changing the law to automatically give shareholders the new
rights we are discussing. Rather, in the normal course, corporate
managers and boards of directors would typically continue to func-
tion as they currently do.
It is our view that shareholders should be given the ability to
"opt out" of the current structure of corporate governance. Specif-
ically, we propose that shareholders should have the right to organ-
ize their corporations so as to ,give themselves the right to give
incumbent managers a vote of "no confidence" at their annual
meeting. For example, shareholders should be allowed to vote to
terminate the employment of existing management and require the
board immediately to initiate a search for a new management
team. Second, we propose that shareholders should be able to con-
tract for the right to sell the company in which they own shares.
Shareholders still currently have no automatic power to initiate
transactions. Instead, they simply have the right to approve or re-
1997]
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ject a proposed transaction typically negotiated by the corporate
managers and approved by the board of directors.
Our perspective is reflected, to some extent, by Warren Buf-
fett, whose managerial approach is showcased in this symposium.
Like Mr. Buffett, we propose changing corporate law to permit
shareholders to be treated a bit more like partners when they elect
to be so treated. Mr. Buffett has observed, with respect to the
Berkshire Hathaway corporation:
Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.
Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-part-
ners, and of ourselves as managing partners .... We do not
view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business
assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which
our shareholders own the assets.10
In this Article we argue that this is the way that at least some
publicly held firms should be run. In modern practice, boards of
directors of public corporations sometimes do not adequately rep-
resent the interests of shareholders. As a practical matter, certain
corporate boards often serve primarily to insulate management
from market forces. Shareholders should be able to curtail this
phenomenon.
Our idea, then, is to give shareholders the opportunity to con-
tract for a greater voice precisely in the area of changes in corpo-
rate control, where boards of directors are faced with the most
important and fundamental decisions. Often, these are the deci-
sions that present the most severe and subtle conflicts of interest.
We make three points in support of our argument that share-
holders in some firms might value the alternative contractual
framework we are proposing. First, many corporations, particu-
larly in the field of financial services, have become so complex, and
modern business practice so sophisticated, that boards cannot real-
istically be expected to understand, much less monitor and control
the firms on whose boards they sit. The recent conflicts over deriv-
atives transactions involving Bankers Trust, Gibson Greetings, and
Proctor and Gamble illustrate this point well. Because these
businesses have simply become too complex, we doubt that the di-
rectors of these companies were able to satisfy even the minimum
requirement that they have a basic understanding of the business
10 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Compilation, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for
Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV 1, 29 (1997).
11 See James C. Allen, Structured Derivatives Back, Black Eye Fading, AM. BANKER,
May 1, 1996, at 22.
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of the corporations. Ironically, in these high profile examples in-
volving the sale and use of financial derivatives, none of the boards
appear to have had a clear understanding of the businesses in
which they were engaged or the manner in which management pur-
sued corporate profits. This is particularly true of certain outside
directors who spend only a few hours each month reviewing only
summary materials. Importantly, these conflicts also illustrate that
shareholders bear the economic risk of a failure of managers and
directors to understand fully non-fundamental but financially
charged aspects of the businesses that they oversee.
Our second point relates to the proper scope of corporate law.
We observe that in its current incarnation, corporate law performs
very well in certain contexts. That is, the legal system performs
well both in situations involving palpable conflicts of interest, and
in cases involving ordinary business judgments about relatively
mundane events. Our proposal addresses the large gray area be-
tween these two extremes. Our recommendations are designed to
bolster the performance of corporate law as a mechanism for moni-
toring and controlling management where the conflicts of interest
may be more subtle. In these contexts, the legal system at times
has performed poorly. And shareholders of some firms may be in
a better position to judge their own interests. As the true parties in
economic interest, shareholders have both the strongest motivation
to monitor corporate performance and the strongest claim to make
the most fundamental decisions affecting those interests. However,
we recognize that shareholders may lack the expertise to evaluate a
particular issue.
Finally, we note that technology has changed to make commu-
nications between firms and shareholders easier. Thus much of the
information routinely communicated to boards by management
can now also be communicated to shareholders at very low cost.
This, coupled with the increasingly sophisticated securities markets,
should for some firms mitigate the need for boards of directors to
intercede between shareholders and management. As the costs of
exchanging information and of collective action are reduced
through the use of investment intermediaries and electronic com-
munication, a principal justification for the broad agency powers of
the board of directors as representatives of shareholders' interests
is weakened.
Sometimes, the legal powers retained by boards of directors-
such as recommending sales of assets and mergers-should be de-
volved in part to the shareholders. Moreover, shareholders should
19971 295
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be able to elect to revise the directors' traditional role in ap-
pointing corporate officers. We recognize that directors should
continue to have the power to appoint management because collec-
tive action problems and rational ignorance1 2 make it too costly for
shareholders to nominate their own slates of managers. However,
giving shareholders the right to register a vote of no confidence
would mitigate the conflict of interest problem without delegating
to shareholders responsibilities that are unrealistic in light of their
capacities.
Part I will describe the basic contours and purposes of the
legal rules affecting boards of directors and explain where the rules
work and where they do not. Part II will explain and defend our
proposal for substituting board leadership with more direct share-
holder involvement. Part III will address the politics of our propo-
sal. Part IV will address certain shareholder voting issues.
I. THE PURPOSE OF CORPORATE LAW
Corporate law and corporate lawyers help society by facilitat-
ing capital formation, reallocating capital to its highest valuing
users, and insuring that resources are utilized in an efficient man-
ner. Corporate law helps capital formation in a number of ways:
(1) by shifting the risks of investing in the firm to people and firms
better situated to bear such risks (limited liability); (2) by providing
standard contractual terms that reduce the transaction costs of in-
vesting, and (3) by reducing agency costs, i.e., by reducing the costs
to shareholders of monitoring and controlling the behavior of their
agents, who, in this context, are both corporate managers and
directors.
As Professor Melvin Eisenberg has observed, the divergences
of interest between managers and shareholders can be divided into
three categories: (A) shirking; (B) positional conflicts of interest;
and (C) traditional conflicts of interest.13
12 See Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate
Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 52-53 (1985), for further insight on how collective action
problems and rational ignorance justify the board of directors' power to appoint
management.
13 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1461, 1471-74 (1989).
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A. Shirking
Garden-variety shirking consists of everything from being in-
competent or lazy ("working at a slack pace"), 14 to allocating cor-
porate resources for things that are of high value to the manager
and of little or no value to the firm (i.e., corporate sponsorship of
artistic events and athletic contests, corporate jets, plush executive
suites, and extra personnel).
Corporate law currently does almost nothing to deal with this
sort of agency cost. Instead, solutions to this problem are essen-
tially left to market forces, particularly to the markets for corpo-
rate control and the managerial labor market. The problem with
these solutions is that they are what might be referred to as
"lumpy." This moeans that a firm's value must fall by quite a lot
before it becomes cost-effective to launch a hostile takeover, par-
ticularly in light of the assistance state anti-takeover statutes pro-
vide to incumbent management. For example, in 1990, General
Motors, plagued by chronically bad management, declining market
share, declining profits, and declining employment, was able to re-
buff efforts by large shareholders to reform the firm.' 5 The busi-
ness judgment rule serves as a sensible-and powerful-barrier to
legal action that would act to second-guess corporate managers'
own judgment.
In essence, the business judgment rule permits managers to
insulate themselves from liability for shirking. Moreover, corpora-
tions often can opt out of the fiduciary duty of care.16 The point
here is not that shirking is a colossal problem within the large, pub-
licly held corporation. Rather, the point is that to the extent that
shirking is controlled within such firms, it is market forces, rather
than legal rules, that constrain managers' proclivities to shirk. Fur-
ther, the efficiency of market forces to control shirking is directly
related to the costs associated with marshaling and directing such
forces. The relationship of these costs to the interest and behavior
of the individual shareholder is discussed in more detail below.
B. Positional Conflicts of Interest
In a wide variety of contexts, managers have an incentive to
use their positions to benefit themselves at the expense of share-
holders. An older CEO manager might know very well that a
14 Id. at 1471.
15 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 1 (1994).
16 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1997).
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younger colleague would do a better job at the helm of the corpo-
ration, but the older manager, in most cases, will refuse to step
down. A board of directors may refuse to accept an outside offer
for the company, or to make changes to enhance shareholder
value, even though it knows the outside bidder would enhance
shareholder value, either because the directors owe personal debts
of loyalty to the incumbent managers, or because the directors do
not want to be replaced. Here again, corporate law does not al-
ways do a very good job in controlling agency costs. The costs of
shareholder action are significant, and provide a de facto safe har-
bor for a significant amount of shirking by managers and directors.
The most significant manifestation of this category of agency
cost involves resistance to takeovers.17 In this context, courts are
supposed to impose an intermediate standard of review on direc-
tors' actions. This intermediate standard of review will maximize
shareholder value in some contexts but not others. In particular, it
is important that shareholders be able to contract to impose restric-
tions on directors' ability to defend against takeovers. While such
contractual protections will not always be necessary, sometimes
they will be.
18
Following the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Para-
mount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc.,1 9 many practicing law-
yers advise their corporate clients that in the context of stock-for-
stock mergers, a board is not required to conduct an auction to
obtain the highest consideration, or to pursue its so-called "Revlon
duties '20 if the board avoids seeking a competing bid. This case
and its progeny also provide the legal basis for practitioners to ad-
vise corporate boards that in the context of a stock-for-stock
merger offer, the board should not make its decision on the basis of
the current market value of the *shares being offered, but should
instead evaluate all the elements involved in the offer over a time
frame that it considers to be appropriate. The basic rationale un-
derlying these decisions is, of course, sound and consistent with the
business judgment rule. We also support the practical implications
of these decisions, which give corporate boards very broad leeway
to accept or reject many merger proposals. However, we also think
that shareholders should, if they wish, be able to elect to opt out of
17 See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1472 n.47.
18 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE
L.J. 127 (1988).
19 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
20 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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the corporate governance framework created by these decisions.
In this context, we find it significant that these proposals often are
not made public by either the proposing or target company. Poten-
tial acquirers do not want to spark interest in the target and initiate
a bidding war. They could lose to another bidder or end up win-
ning but at a higher cost. Ironically, target companies often do not
announce the receipt of a proposal for the same reason.
C. Traditional Shirking
Beyond garden-variety shirking and potential conflicts of
interest, managers sometimes will have actual conflicts of interest
with their firms. The sale by a manager of personal property or
other assets to the firm he manages, for example, presents a con-
flict of interest. The manager would like to receive a high price for
the assets, but at the same time he has a responsibility to the firm
to secure as low a price as possible. Here the legal system has met
with more success, largely because conflict of interest transactions
are concrete events that the legal system can identify and deal with
procedurally.
II. EMPOWERING SHAREHOLDERS
In this part we will explain and defend the specifics of our pro-
posal for improving shareholder democracy. The specifics of our
proposal are simple. We believe that shareholders should be able
to elect to have a corporate charter that allows them to register a
vote of no confidence at the annual meeting of shareholders.
Charter provisions could, for example, provide that such a vote
would cause the termination of existing management. The charter
could further provide that this vote of no confidence would imme-
diately require the board of directors to initiate a search for a new
management team, to be completed, say, not later than one year
from the date of the no confidence vote. We also believe share-
holders should be able to contract ex ante for the right to put the
company in which they own shares up for sale. It is not enough
that shareholders have the opportunity simply to sell their shares if
they think that corporate managers are not pursuing the correct
strategy. Often, fundamental transactions such as mergers and
sales involve significant premiums to the current market value of
the target company. This premium may be derived from any
number of sources, including the acquirer's superior management
ability, anticipated consolidation savings, or projected increases in
revenues resulting from cross marketing. What is important, how-
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ever, is that this premium may not be available to shareholders un-
less the company is sold as a whole or is merged into another
company. In industries of significant excess capacity, capturing this
takeover premium may represent the best alternative for share-
holders and also the worst alternative for displaced managers and
directors who may have limited expertise in a shrinking industry.
On the other hand, certain shareholder groups may be suscep-
tible to abusive or coercive two-tiered tender offers and may prefer
to give their managers a free hand to defend against such take-
overs. Shareholders in these firms should have the right to em-
power the directors to take particularly aggressive steps to protect
their shareholders' interests. .
We identify three issues raised by our proposal. First, we rec-
ognize that utilization of our proposal by some firms may actually
exacerbate the collective action problems of rational ignorance and
free-riding that plague shareholders, preventing them from making
intelligent decisions about the fate of the firms in which they have
invested.
In light of these problems and in the face of overwhelming
evidence demonstrating that enabling rules are far superior to
mandatory rules,"' we conclude that our proposed new rule should
be a default rule, rather than a mandatory rule. We identify situa-
tions in which particular firms would be better off if our rule were
imposed. And we stress that the optimal time for implementation
of our rule is ex ante, rather than ex post, when an annual meeting
is approaching. We also argue that opting into the rule that we
propose should have certain implications for the potential legal lia-
bility of corporate directors.
Second, we discuss the possible objection that firms that adopt
our rule will find it more difficult to recruit and retain top manage-
ment because of the lack of job security for such managers in firms
that opt into a legal regime in which dismissing managers can be
accomplished directly by shareholder vote. Finally, we discuss an
entirely practical objection to our proposal. Specifically, as noted
above, it seems likely that our proposal will not be wildly popular
with incumbent management. In an age when managers have suc-
cessfully persuaded state legislators to pass antitakeover laws with
significant mandatory components that sometimes reduce share-
holder welfare, it seems unlikely that state legislators will be enthu-
siastic about voting for legislation that implements our proposal.
21 See Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Cri-
tique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530 (1989).
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Instead, we argue that firms should implement our rules via charter
amendments, and that courts could provide managers with incen-
tives to adopt our proposal by insulating managers and directors
from liability for violating their fiduciary duties of care when they
manage firms that are organized along the lines we propose here.
We also note that golden parachutes and other executive compen-
sation arrangements could be used to make our proposal more
palatable to management.
A. Collective Action Problems
An important issue to be evaluated by shareholders consider-
ing whether to implement our. proposal is that the widely dispersed
and fragmented shareholders that characterize the American pub-
lic corporation may not be sufficiently well informed to make con-
sidered, informed decisions about the future of the firms in which
they have invested.
The problems of direct shareholder involvement in corporate
affairs are well known. Indeed, Mark Roe has written an entire
book in which he suggests that politics has impeded American cor-
porations from reaching a truly efficient system of corporate gov-
ernance in which managers share power with institutional investors




Dispersion in small holdings creates a collective action problem
for shareholders, making managers less accountable in a way
that can hurt performance, particularly when the firm faces unu-
sual problems.
If scattered shareholders cannot understand complexity,
and if managers cannot be rewarded for what shareholders can-
not understand, firms may abandon some long-term, technologi-
cally complex projects.23
In our view, the problem often is not that shareholders cannot
understand complexity. Rather, the problems are three-fold. First,
the collective action problems of free riding and rational ignorance
often create conditions in which it is not within shareholders' inter-
ests (as opposed to competence) to become informed about the
merits of a particular transaction. Second, even when shareholders
know what is best for their firms, collective action problems may
22 ROE, supra note 15, at 9.
23 Id.
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create conditions under which shareholder voting to further their
own private objectives results in an election outcome that makes
the shareholders as a group worse off.
Finally, of course, is the problem that shareholders' prefer-
ences sometimes simply do not count for much with management.
Managers, on occasion, have too much freedom to pursue their
own ends because widely dispersed shareholders cannot effectively
monitor and control them. Further, managers and directors have a
keen appreciation, based upon experience, for how difficult and
costly it is to persuade shareholders to vote their shares in support
of a particular position. Examples of shareholder activism, such as
the efforts of Michael Price to prompt changes at Michigan Na-
tional and Chase, are noteworthy in part because of their rarity.
These examples are also illustrative of the tremendous expense in-
volved in influencing the board and management without resorting
to a proxy contest. Few shareholders are capable of accumulating
an economic stake sufficient to cause management to give them
more than a perfunctory hearing, and fewer still have the resources
to present a real threat to corporate control.
The market for corporate control is a powerful device for
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. But in recent
years managers have succeeded in enacting laws that make hostile
takeovers more difficult to accomplish. Such laws can harm share-
holders in several ways, particularly if they are mandatory rather
than enabling. On the other hand, where such rules are enabling,
they can enhance shareholder value by resolving the collective ac-
tion problem that plagues shareholders in the face of a coercive
two-tiered takeover.
Mandatory state anti-takeover laws can prevent shareholders
from profiting by transferring their shares to rival management
teams. Second, state anti-takeover laws discourage outside moni-
toring by potential hostile bidders, thereby reducing the value of all
firms by increasing the incumbent management's ability to shirk.
Finally, such antitakeover laws lower managerial incentives to max-
imize firm value as a means of reducing the probability of hostile
takeover bids.
Our proposal is a means of partially compensating for the
weaknesses in the market for corporate control caused by state
anti-takeover laws. Under our proposal, even in the absence of a
formally announced outside takeover bid, shareholders could uni-
laterally force directors to put the firm up for sale. Such a vote
[Vol. 19:291
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would automatically nullify the effects of poison pills and other an-
titakeover devices within the firm.
We fully acknowledge, however, that there is some merit to
the argument that shareholders face a daunting collective action
problem that impedes their ability to inform themselves fully about
the nature of the problems within the firms in which they have in-
vested. One of these problems is a rational ignorance problem.
The other is a free-rider problem.
The concepts of rational ignorance and free-riding describe
the idea that often it is not in a shareholder's individual interest to
invest the personal resources necessary to monitor and evaluate
the performance of the managers of the firms in which they have
invested. This is true despite the fact that it will be in the share-
holders' collective interest that such money be invested. A simple
example illustrates this point.
Suppose that a firm has one hundred shareholders, each of
whom owns one share of stock. Suppose further that each share of
stock is currently valued at $1.00 per share, so the aggregate mar-
ket value of the firm's capital is $100. Suppose further that an in-
vestment of $50 would reveal that management is diverting sums
with a present value of $100 to its own uses. Such an investigation
would result in a net increase in the value of the firm's equity from
$100 to $150, and in the value of each shareholder's shares from
$1.00 to $1.50. But, while it clearly would be in the interests of all
shareholders that this investment be made, it does not make sense
for any individual shareholder to make the investment himself.
This is because an individual shareholder would have to pay the
entire $50 necessary to uncover the managers' actions, but would
only capture 500 of the gain, resulting in a net loss of $49.50 on the
investment.
The collective action problems described in the above example
are easy to identify. First, it is rational for each individual share-
holder to remain ignorant of the information that would be uncov-
ered by the search because its benefits are not worth the costs
when calculated on an individual basis. This example also makes
clear the relationship between the size of an investor's stake and
her motivation to take action. Free riding is simply the other side
of the same coin. The fact that the shareholders who do not pay
the costs of the investigation are nonetheless able to benefit from a
general rise in the share price that the investigation triggers is
known as free riding. The nonpaying shareholders take a free ride
on any investment in monitoring made by the other shareholders.
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Where free riding is possible, there will be a suboptimal amount of
production in the goods (here, information) that are subject to the
free riding.
The point, of course, is that the widely dispersed, small stake
shareholders that characteristically invest in American corpora-
tions are plagued by rational ignorance and free rider problems. A
problem with our proposal is that these rational ignorance and free
riding problems prevent shareholders from being able to inform
themselves sufficiently about what is going on in corporations to
know when to oust incumbent management, and when to put the
company that they own up for sale.
Our response is simple. We acknowledge that free rider and
rational ignorance problems exist. These problems prevent share-
holders from micromanaging corporations. However, as Easter-
brook and Fischel have pointed out, rational ignorance and free
riding problems are much more acute for small problems within
firms than for larger problems.24 As problems within a firm be-
come larger, it becomes rational for shareholders to make the in-
vestments necessary to solve the problems despite the existence of
rational ignorance and free riding. This is why shareholders are
allowed to vote on important issues, such as changes to the corpo-
rate form-i.e., mergers, sales of control, and sales of all or sub-
stantially all of a corporation's assets. These are big issues, about
which small stake shareholders are likely to be sufficiently well in-
formed to make rational judgments. Admittedly, however, even in
the case of the example above, in which a net increase in share-
holder value equal to 50% is described, one can see that it may still
be rational for a shareholder not to take action despite the signifi-
cant potential gains, if the cost of realizing those net gains is still
quite large. This is particularly true when the costs are ex ante.
Our proposal is intended to lower the costs of realizing gains,
thereby increasing both the net gain and any impediment to fund-
ing the costs in advance of receipt of the gain.
Moreover, under our proposal, rival management teams would
find it in their best interests to help shareholders overcome free
rider problems by informing shareholders when incumbent man-
agement is doing a bad job. In other words, the rational ignorance
and free riding problems can be overcome not only where there are
24 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). For elaboration
on the basic model, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk
Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982).
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big stakes issues, but also where there are individuals or firms with
a disproportionate amount to gain from gathering and disseminat-
ing information. This group would include not only rival manage-
ment teams, but also large block shareholders, stockbrokers, and
financial analysts, all of whom stand to gain from identifying in-
competent management teams.
In this context, it is critically important to note that our propo-
sal does not expand either the incidence or risk of rational igno-
rance or free riding, nor does it expand the set of issues about
which shareholders are currently permitted to vote. Under present
law, shareholders vote annually for the firm's board of directors.
In theory, shareholders can always replace current management
with an outside management team. Unfortunately, rival manage-
ment teams do not always present themselves to shareholders for
approval. And, of course, under present law and corporate prac-
tice, shareholders can always decide whether they wish to sell their
shares to an outsider in order to help effectuate a change in corpo-
rate control. Shareholders also are entitled to vote on merger pro-
posals by outsiders. While these elements of corporate law provide
shareholders with some measure of relief, as we have stated previ-
ously, a sale of one's shares, even to a potential acquirer, rarely will
capture the full premium that a sale of the company may provide
to shareholders. Moreover, shareholders will not have the oppor-
tunity to vote on a merger proposal unless the board has already
approved the transaction presented by management.
Thus, we emphasize that our proposal does not expand the set
of issues about which shareholders are expected to be informed
under current law. Our proposal simply expands shareholders'
power to do something about their conviction that incumbent man-
agement is unsatisfactory. Finally, we also argue that the imple-
mentation of our proposal presents an important additional
incentive for corporate management and boards to inform them-
selves and to make decisions more closely aligned with the inter-
ests of shareholders. Neither the management nor the board is
likely to want to expose itself to the public embarrassment that a
vote of no confidence or a vote to sell the company is likely to
engender. Because these actions by shareholders are essentially a
public announcement that shareholders do not believe the manag-
ers and board are doing their jobs properly, there will be significant
motivation for these parties to steer well clear of actions that would
reasonably cause such votes to take place. Because the vote of no
confidence and the vote to put the company up for sale could be
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effected more easily and cheaply than taking control of the corpo-
ration and voting in a new board, the threshold of what constitutes
egregious behavior would be moved significantly lower.
B. Mandatory Versus Permissive Legal Rules
As set forth above, we think it is preferable that any changes
made to corporate charters implementing our proposal be done on
a voluntary basis. We also think it is preferable for any such
changes to have a long enough duration to make it likely for an
adoption of any such change to take place in the midst of a chal-
lenge for control or during a contested corporate restructuring. In
order to ensure a fair consideration of our proposal, and to balance
the right of shareholders who are more likely to favor our proposal
with the interests of managers and board members who are more
likely to favor the status quo (and who have the full resources of
the corporation at their disposal), we think it is necessary that the
implementation of our proposal take the form of a default provi-
sion in corporate law. Using the "opt in" model commonly used in
corporate and partnership laws,25 we suggest that the individual
firms could amend their articles of incorporation and that the
shareholders would be required to adopt affirmatively the provi-
sions proposed prior to the end of the opt out period by a majority
vote.
Under our proposal, shareholders could contract for the right
to deliver a vote of no confidence at either the annual meeting or
at any special meeting of shareholders. This would do more than a
simple vote against the proposed slate of directors or an abstention
from voting. Neither of these alternatives gives shareholders much
real authority. In the first instance, the vote vis- -vis the board
members up for election is a blunt and inefficient tool for changing
the senior management of the corporation. Secondly, assuming
that the proposed slate of directors is not elected, it is not alto-
gether clear what authority the board would have pending the elec-
tion of acceptable candidates. In the case of staggered terms this is
less troublesome. However, in the case of a single class of direc-
tors, it would present a potentially risky position for the corpora-
tion. Almost invariably, too, shareholders have little information
25 See, e.g., RMBCA § 3.02 ("Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise,
every corporation has perpetual duration and succession in its corporate name and has the
same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its busi-
ness and affairs."); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 18 (1914) ("The rights and duties of the
partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement be-
tween them, by the following rules.").
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available to them to allow them to assess whether the directors
who are up for reelection to the board are the ones who have failed
to represent shareholders' interests properly. Proxy statements
typically give no information about the attendance or positions
taken by individual board members. As a result, shareholders are
most often forced to vote blindly for change or no change, as op-
posed to "for" or "against" an individual who supports or opposes
their interests.
Abstention from voting offers a similarly perverse result. Sim-
ply not voting increases the relative value of all those who do vote
directly or more commonly through proxy. Candidates can
thereby be elected with fewer affirmative votes. Neither alterna-
tive gives shareholders a meaningful or satisfying remedy for poor
board performance. Our proposal Would allow for a more direct
expression of shareholders' interests when a majority believes that
the board is not adequately pursuing these interests. Instead of
voting to change the board in the hope that a newly configured
board might take action to replace the managers who actually run
the corporation, a vote of no confidence creates a shortcut to that
process and tells the board that it is time to hire new managers.
Similarly, a directive by the shareholders that they want the board
to pursue a sale is a clear and simple message that they believe the
board and senior management are not fully exploring these options
on their behalf. Blindly configuring the board or abstaining from
voting sends, at best, an ambiguous message.
Once a vote of no confidence has been given, or once the
shareholders have directed the board to sell the corporation, the
board would be relieved of its normal obligations under corporate
law and would not have to. rely on the business judgment rule with
respect to those specific decisions. However, the board would con-
tinue to be obligated to exercise its reasonable business judgment
with respect to the implementation of the shareholders' directives.
For example, if the shareholders of a corporation delivered a vote
of no confidence at the corporation's annual meeting, the board
would be obligated to initiate an immediate search for replace-
ments for the corporation's executive officers. The board would
not be legally responsible for damages to the corporation arising
from the shareholders' decision to terminate and replace the ex-
isting management team. All other actions and decisions by the
board with respect to retaining new managers would still be subject
to the normal application of the business judgment rule. The board
would be obligated to conduct a search reasonably calculated to
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find the best qualified managers for the corporation. The board
also would be obligated to use its reasonable business judgment to
retain the best available managers on terms that would be in the
shareholders' best interests.
The more difficult case is presented by a vote to put the corpo-
ration up for sale; however, on balance, we think that our proposal
presents an improvement to the current practice. As we envision
it, a directive by shareholders to put the company up for sale would
not necessarily result in a sale of the company. Such a vote by
shareholders would simply require that the board and appropriate
members of senior management immediately explore the market
for a sale or merger, negotiate the best alternative, and present that
proposed transaction to the shareholders for approval. Although
in most cases we would anticipate that shareholders who vote to
put the company up for sale will accept the proposed transaction
(absent a significant change in market conditions during the pen-
dency of this process), it would not always be the case. Price ex-
pectations may not be fulfilled or other terms may be unacceptable
to shareholders. We anticipate, however, that with respect to ulti-
mate approval, the experience with shareholder initiated mergers
and sales will be substantially similar to the experience of board
initiated and recommended mergers and sales.
Although it may be argued that our proposal would result in
the shareholders of most corporations voting to place their corpo-
rations up for sale to capture whatever acquisition premium could
be obtained, and that this would present an unacceptable social
cost, we think this is unlikely to happen. First, we suggest that
shareholders have the potential to be every bit as rational and ca-
pable as the directors who represent them and who currently have
such authority. We do not think that shareholders would place
their corporations up for sale simply to test the market. In the nor-
mal course, shareholders will-and should-continue to rely upon
the judgment of the corporation's executive managers and its
board of directors to determine the corporation's future. This is
because corporate boards can do a lot of things-particularly in the
context of a hostile takeover-that increase shareholder value.
This remedy would only come into play in those cases in which it
appeared to a majority of shareholders that the interests of man-
agement and the board were not closely aligned with those of
shareholders. Individual shareholders would continue to have the
right to sell their shares in the market and to terminate their rela-
tionship with the corporation. However, it would only be rational
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for shareholders as a group to vote to sell the corporation if a ma-
jority in interest reasonably expected that a sale of the corporation
would produce a higher price, after adjusting both for the time de-
lay and risk of execution, including the- possible adverse effect on
price that may result from a public declaration of the interests of
shareholders to seek a buyer, and the possible adverse impact on
employee morale and retention. We do not think that shareholders
are likely to "cry wolf." Even if they do, we think it is their right as
owners to sell even at less than optimal prices.
It may also be argued that anticipated consolidation savings
would almost invariably produce higher acquisition prices for
shareholders who vote to sell their corporations and that, accord-
ingly, the implementation of our proposal would result in an unac-
ceptable concentration of control and ownership of America's
corporations, resulting in potentially significant social implications.
In response, we offer that we are not proposing the wholesale re-
structuring of all laws affecting corporations. Antitrust and other
laws regulating investment would, of course, continue in full effect.
By itself, our proposal would not result in a concentration of con-
trol or ownership greater than that which could otherwise result if
only boards could initiate mergers and sales. Moreover, we think
shareholders are likely to recognize the antitrust risk when consid-
ering the probable results of a sale and when deciding whether to
direct the board to pursue a transaction. Additionally, we suggest
that if boards are knowingly or unknowingly supporting a populist
agenda not required by law and avoiding transactions that would
benefit shareholders because of these social concerns, our proposal
is all the more necessary.
C. Recruiting and Retaining Top Managers
Another potential concern with our proposal is the possible
adverse impact on the ability of corporations that have adopted
our Proposal (either affirmatively or by default) to attract and re-
tain top quality managers. We think the practical impact on execu-
tive compensation would be negligible. United States corporate
executive compensation is already at a comparatively high level,
both from a historic and a national perspective. Moreover, many
corporate executives receive a significant portion of their compen-
sation in equity and equity-related forms. Many are also employed
pursuant to agreements, with generous additional compensation
for termination following a change of control. Accordingly, in the
event of a shareholder initiated merger or sale, these executives
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would receive additional compensation just as they would in the
event of a director initiated transaction. In any event, the question
becomes whether or not the risk of a transaction would materially
increase as a result of our proposal, causing better executives to
require greater compensation for that increased risk. Assuming
that the increased risk would exist and would not be compensated
by existing arrangements, we think this is simply a direct cost that
shareholders would have to bear to avail themselves of the benefits
of our proposal. We think that the benefits sometimes will out-
weigh the costs in this regard, even if shareholders never actually
exercise their rights and do not deliver a vote of no confidence or
direct the board to pursue a sale of the company. We think that
lowering the threshold for shareholder action sometimes will limit
shirking and other wasteful behavior that will more than offset any
additional compensation that is required. If our proposal does, in
fact, result in more transactions and greater consolidation, demand
for executives will be correspondingly reduced, resulting in addi-
tional downward pressure on compensation packages. Further-
more, if shareholders think that the costs in terms of retaining top-
flight managers and directors are greater than the benefits, they are
always free to reject our proposal. Our point is not that all, or even
most, corporations would-or should-adopt our proposal.
Rather, our point is simply that shareholders should have the op-
tion of organizing themselves in the way we describe here.
III. THE POLITICS OF OUR PROPOSAL
Although properly viewed, our proposal represents an oppor-
tunity for shareholders to achieve rebalancing of the rights be-
tween shareholders and their representatives, we would anticipate
considerable resistance to our proposal both by managers and
board members. Most corporations would probably actively op-
pose our proposal. Successful corporate managers have become
successful in large part because of their success in managing the
members of the board. Board members likewise have learned that
the best way to ensure continuity is to avoid disputes with manage-
ment. Both parties can comfort themselves that their mutually
beneficial relationship provides shareholders with the best value.
Indeed, shareholders of such firms are likely to decline to give
themselves the new rights we are outlining anyway, because they
would prefer to continue to delegate decisionmaking to the board
where the board is acting in their interests. To the extent that the
management and board are in fact functioning in the best interests
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of shareholders, however, our proposal represents no real change.
To the extent that the actions of the board and management do not
reasonably reflect the interests of shareholders, our proposal repre-
sents a significant threat to the continued relationship of the execu-
tive management, the board, and the shareholders.
Notwithstanding that most managers and board members
would not be affected directly by our proposal, we suspect that the
vast majority would oppose our proposal out of concerns that irra-
tional shareholders might either force a turnover in management
or place the company up for sale, either for no good reason or for
their own economic interests. The ever-increasing percentage of
corporate shares owned by mutual funds, pension funds, and insti-
tutional investors makes it increasingly unlikely that such irrational
behavior is a risk, however. Individual investors are significantly
better informed today than they were when the structural founda-
tions of our corporate law were put in place. Wall Street firms
have focused on the individual investor, providing the product of
their well-educated and well-informed research departments to
their clients for the asking (and perhaps a small fee). These devel-
opments reduce the policy reasons underlying our somewhat pater-
nalistic form of corporate governance, which does not allow the
customization of the corporate contract that we propose here.
Most recently, the virtual explosion of the telecommunications
and computer industries has made the rapid dissemination of infor-
mation and analysis commonplace. The EDGAR filing system,26
combined with the Securities and Exchange Commission internet
web site, 27 allow anyone with a browser, a modem, and a telephone
line the opportunity to obtain all of a corporation's electronic pub-
lic filings with that agency within twenty-four hours of its filing, and
most other filings within a few days. Electronic mail and secure
networks have combined with expanded financial news coverage to
provide today's shareholder with communications and information
resources that often rival those available to the board of directors.
We think these structural and technological changes will ultimately
produce changes in corporate governance procedures along the
lines that we are proposing today, despite the opposition of various
interest groups in the interim.
26 EDGAR Database of Corporate Information (last modified Oct. 14, 1997) <http://
www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm>.
27 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (visited Oct. 17, 1997) <http://
www.sec.gov>.
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IV. SHAREHOLDER VOTING
Corporate law promotes the formation of capital by permit-
ting the directors to manage the affairs of the corporations for
which they serve. In public corporations there is a separation of
stock ownership from management for a good reason. The reason
for this separation is that it permits specialization in the economy.
Shareholders can enjoy the benefit of enhanced shareholder value
without bearing what would be for them the impossible burden of
managing the firm. Various aspects of traditional corporate law
place the principal responsibility and authority for corporate ac-
tions on the shoulders of the directors. For practical and logical
reasons, the corporate governance tools generally available to
shareholders are overly blunt instruments, well suited only for the
most extreme cases of misconduct. From a corporate governance
perspective, shareholder voting provides more benefits in certain
contexts than in others. That is why shareholders do not have the
right to vote on all significant corporate decisions. As Easterbrook
and Fischel have observed:
[S]hareholders express views by buying and selling shares; they
have no reason to hamstring their firms or impose other costs
that make their firm less effective competitors. They are un-
likely to know better than the managers how to run the firms
and thus cannot either make good decisions or recognize bad
ones.
28
Moreover, we recognize that for shareholders, shareholder democ-
racy is a means to an end. The end is maximization of share value.
We think that, in general, the current state of corporate law is
quite efficient. However, for a few firms, the current system does
not serve shareholders well. We think that for those firms, share-
holders should be able opt out of the traditional corporate govern-
ance pattern in which the directors have broad powers to run the
firm, and to opt into a radically new corporate governance frame-
work. But we caution that this should be done sparingly. In partic-
ular, we suggest that shareholders be given the ability to amend the
articles to accomplish two objectives.
First, we propose that shareholders be given the right to de-
liver to the board of directors a vote of no confidence in senior
management, requiring the board to take immediate action to re-
place the existing executive management team. Additionally, we
propose that shareholders be given the right to direct the board to
28 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
EcoN. 395, 396-97 (1983).
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initiate a review of possible sale or merger alternatives, and to
present the best alternative to shareholders for their consideration.
Because these proposed changes to corporate law would make it
substantially easier for shareholders to convey their dissatisfaction
with the business judgments of management and the board, and
because this expression of dissatisfaction would be publicly dis-
closed, we think these corporate governance tools would have sig-
nificant impact, even though we anticipate that they would be used
only in highly unusual circumstances, such as persistent managerial
abuse of power, and where shareholders are unusually sophisti-
cated and mistrustful of management. The desire to avoid public
embarrassment would provide considerable motivation for manag-
ers and directors to act on behalf of shareholders' interests.
One of the reasons we think our proposal may be of value for
some firms is that we think that there may well be occasions where
executive management and the board have acted reasonably (and
within the broad safe harbor of the business judgment rule) but not
in a manner consistent with what the majority of shareholders may
have wanted.
We further recognize that sometimes when these divergences
occur, the directors will be correct. Therefore, sophisticated share-
holders may not want to purchase shares in a corporation governed
by articles of incorporation that reflect our proposal because they
do not want to be outvoted by a majority of unsophisticated public
shareholders. We acknowledge that this will limit the usefulness of
our proposal.
We also wish to stress that shareholders in publicly traded
firms often will find themselves the targets of coercive two-tiered
hostile takeovers in which shareholders are pressured into ac-
cepting a low-ball, front-end bid in order to avoid winding up as
shareholders in a merged firm that they do not think is compe-
tently run by the acquirers or being "taken out" in the back-end
merger at an artificially low-price. Thus, shareholders may wish to
tailor the articles of incorporation specifically to empower their di-
rectors strongly to resist these sorts of coercive acquisition
proposals.
Finally, we emphasize that we are not proposing that share-
holders be given the right to micromanage the corporations in
which they invest. Instead, we are proposing that the myths of di-
rector infallibility and shareholder incapacity should be set aside in
favor of direct voting by shareholders only with respect to the most
important and fundamental decisions that a corporation makes.
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Under current corporate law, a merger or sale proposal is typically
presented to shareholders only after it has been approved by the
board of directors, and often by the executive management as well.
In the normal course, boards of directors should be entitled to ap-
prove merger proposals and to present to shareholders only those
proposals that they deem worthy of their attention. But some
shareholder groups may want to allocate more power to them-
selves. Under current law, even if a majority of shareholders
thinks it is appropriate to seek a buyer for the company, they may
find it extremely difficult to compel their directors to attempt to
realize the acquisition premium that they think is available. Practi-
cal considerations often insulate the board and result in sharehold-
ers simply selling their shares and moving on.
One example of a situation in which shareholders might want
to allocate to themselves the power to put their firm up for sale can
be derived from a brief review of the recent decisions by the board
of Apple Computer Company, Inc.
After several years of successfully challenging the dominance
of the personal computing market by Intel-DOS based computers,
Apple went through a period of turmoil with the ouster of two high
profile CEOs. Commentators and analysts questioned whether
Apple could develop a strategy to realize the value of what was
generally regarded as a computer operating system that was, at
worst, the equal of Microsoft's newest system. 9 The trading price
of Apple's shares suffered accordingly, falling from $44.00 per
share on January 2, 1995 to $32.125 per share on January 2, 1996.
As prospects for Apple soured, rumors began to circulate that rival
UNIX operating system-based computer company Sun Microsys-
tems, Inc. was interested in acquiring Apple.3 ° SunWorld Online
reported on its internet web site numerous newspaper reports of
Sun's rumored interest in paying approximately $23 per share for
100% of Apple's stock in a 1-for-1 stock exchange. Apple closed at
$31.375 on January 23, 1996, following publication of the rumor.
On February 2, 1996, the board of Apple met at an emergency
meeting, and replaced Chairman and CEO Michael Spindler with
National Semiconductor Corp. CEO Gilbert F. Amelio.31 Amelio
29 See Kathy Rebello et al., The Fall of an American Icon, Bus. WK., Feb. 5, 1996, at 34;
see also Jim Carlton, Apple CEO Outlines Survival Strategy, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1996, at
A2.
30 See Janet Rae-Dupree & Eddie Yandle, Valley Companies Won't Comment As Ru-
mors Swirl Sun, Apple Are in Talks, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 24, 1996, at IA.
31 See Mike Langberg & Dean Takahashi, Apple Dumps Spindler, Picks Amelio As
CEO, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 2, 1996, at 1A.
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was recognized as a technology turnaround specialist,32 but re-
ceived as part of his compensation arrangement a commitment by
Apple to pay him a $10 million dollar bonus if Apple were ac-
quired within a year of his joining.33
Although Sun never went public with an offer for Apple, Ap-
ple acknowledged that discussions had taken place with several
other potential acquirers, including Oracle, IBM, Canon, and Mo-
torola.34 No proposals were ever presented to Apple's sharehold-
ers for consideration. During the remainder of 1996, Apple
pursued its new strategy of narrowing its product line and cutting
costs. The price of Apple shares continued to slump throughout
the year, however, as seen below in Chart 1. By January 17, 1997,
the price of a share of Apple had fallen to $16.75.
Ironically, 1996 proved to be a banner year for computer
stocks generally, and for Sun in particular. Adjusting for splits in
its stock price, Sun's shares moved up steadily from $22.375 per
share on January 2, 1996, to $31.188 by January 17, 1997, as seen
below in Chart 2. Had the rumored exchange offer by Sun been
effected, Apple's shareholders would have realized a gain of 39%
during the twelve month period instead of a loss of 52%.
We think this experience with Apple illustrates the potential
benefits to be derived from our proposal. The Apple board acted
within its safe harbor and exercised its reasonable business judg-
ment. Shareholders had access to large amounts of information re-
garding the company and its prospects, and several parties were
interested in acquiring Apple. However, without a practically use-
ful means of initiating a merger, shareholders who disagreed with
the decision of the board had no reasonable alternative other than
to sell their shares and move on. By selling their shares at prices
lower than Sun's rumored offer (not accounting for the effect to
the tax deferral value embedded in that offer), Apple's sharehold-
ers in effect indicated that an offer in the rumored range would
have been acceptable to them. Obviously, this analysis is specula-
tive, and we will never know what the Apple shareholders were
actually thinking at that time or what they actually would have
done if they had been able to choose. However, at a time when
shareholders had a significant issue of value to consider, and when
it would have been easy to determine their interest, the board was
32 See id.
33 See Apple's New Chief Could Get in Excess of $10 Million a Year, SAN JOSE MER-
CURY NEWS, Feb. 14, 1996, at 1C.
34 See Dupree & Yandle, supra note 30, at 1A.
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not obligated to find out what shareholders wanted and so it simply
did not do so.
On the other hand, sometimes our proposal should not be
adopted because it might harm shareholders' interests. For exam-
ple, where a bidder makes a coercive, front-end loaded two-tiered
bid for a target company that is intended to coerce stockholders to
tender their shares into the offer to avoid being squeezed out in the
second stage at a low price, shareholders would likely be seriously
disadvantaged by our proposal. Any shareholder vote to sell the
company would be tainted by the collective action problems facing
shareholders. Along these lines, we are well aware of the conflict
of interest problems that exist between shareholders and bidders.
While incumbent boards and management sometimes lack the in-
centives to maximize shareholder value, outside bidders always
lack the incentives to maximize shareholder value in the firms they
are acquiring because such bidders clearly want to acquire target
firms as cheaply as possible. Therefore, in these sorts of cases, tar-
get firms can maximize share value by resisting, and a shareholder
vote to sell the company would benefit acquirers rather than target
shareholders. That is why we think our proposal should only be
used in exceptional circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Corporate boards of directors are given discretion to oversee
the affairs of the firms on whose boards they sit for two reasons.
First, directors have expertise and experience that the shareholders
lack. Second, shareholders in large, publicly held companies often
are too widely dispersed to be able to make a properly informed
decision because of collective action and free rider problems.
The reason corporations have boards of directors is to permit
the separation of ownership from management in public corpora-
tions. The separation of ownership and management is efficient
because it permits specialization in the economy. Shareholders can
enjoy the benefit of enhanced shareholder value without bearing
what would be for them the impossible burden of managing the
firm.
We also recognize that, in a wide variety of situations, defen-
sive tactics, particularly corporate restructurings in the face of a
hostile takeover threat, can enhance shareholder value, both by re-
alizing important efficiencies within the firm, as well as by raising
the price of any ultimate change in control. Thus, unlike certain
scholars, we do not categorically disfavor defensive tactics, and we
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reject the school of thought that holds that firms always should re-
main passive in the face of a hostile bid.35
At the same time, we strongly favor an expanded approach to
choice in corporate law. In particular, we are of the view that cor-
porate law rules in general should follow a contractual pattern in
which shareholders are free to opt out of the standard form, de-
fault rules provided by an existing statutory paradigm. In this Arti-
cle we have advocated expanding the standard set of corporate
charter provisions to permit shareholders to customize their corpo-
rate charters so as to permit shareholders to register a vote of no
confidence in management, and/or to put their companies up for
sale by forcing the directors to conduct an auction for the firm. In
the spirit of the contractual paradigm in which we are operating,
we have repeatedly emphasized that our proposal will be good for
some firms, and bad for others. Thus, we do not propose changing
the long-standing, existing default rule in any way. Under our pro-
posal, firms would still be managed by or under the direction of
boards of directors, who would enjoy not only widespread discre-
tion, but also the full protections of the business judgment rule, in
the management of their firms. Only shareholders of firms who
amended their corporate charters in order to opt into the corporate
governance arrangement we have described would have the new
voting rights we are describing.
We wish to make two concluding observations. First, this Arti-
cle has stressed the agency cost problem within the U.S. corpora-
tion. Sometimes the interests of managers and shareholders do
diverge, and when the divergence becomes sufficiently large, our
proposal may serve the interests of shareholders in some firms. We
also recognize that some shareholders in other firms may want to
give their directors extraordinary powers even beyond those that
directors currently wield in the management of the firm. Thus, for
example, if shareholders wished, they should be able to provide for
the quinquennial election of directors, as some have proposed.36
And, in certain takeover situations, directors clearly should be em-
powered to "just say no" to certain offers, particularly those they
regard as coercive or destructive of shareholder value, or of long-
standing corporate strategies. In other words, we do not view ex-
panded choice as a one way proposition, in which all choice leads
35 See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1986); Easter-
brook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 24.
36 See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Govern-
ance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991).
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to expanded shareholder voting rights. Rather, we view expanded
choice as a mechanism for providing firms with additional flexibil-
ity in every direction. Sometimes this flexibility will lead to new
rights for shareholders, and sometimes to fewer rights for
shareholders.
Finally, we note that it seems to be increasingly easy for share-
holders to second-guess the business decisions made by managers
and directors, and to litigate to challenge those decisions.37 Our
proposal should have the effect of stemming this litigation explo-
sion because it should be much more difficult to challenge the legit-
imacy of directors of firms that have elected not to adopt the
proposal we are describing. In other words, our proposal should
enhance and clarify the authority of directors and managers in
firms whose charter provisions did not create the voting rights we
have discussed here. This, in our view, would be an added benefit
from our proposal.
37 See Macey & Miller, supra note 18.
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